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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY AND THE MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Joint Employer, 
-and-
#lA-12/27/79 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. C-1902 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
LOCAL 829, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
HARVEY & HARVEY (THOMAS DUSSAULT, ESQ., of 
Counsel) for Petitioner 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH (MICHAEL SMITH, 
ESQ., of Counsel) for Intervenor 
WILLIAM E. MOORE, ESQ., for County 
On May 23, 1979, the Montgomery County Deputy Sheriff's 
Association (Association) filed a petition seeking to represent 
35 deputy sheriffs who are jointly employed by the County of 
Montgomery and the Montgomery County Sheriff. The deputy sheriffs 
are currently in a unit of 350 employees. Except for the-.deputy 
sheriffs, all the unit members are employees of the County only. 
That unit is represented by Local 829 of the Civil Service Employee!) 
ssociation, Inc. (CSEA) and it has intervened in this proceeding 
tor the purpose of opposing the petition. Both the County and the 
Sheriff agree with the petitioner that there should be a separate 
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unit for the deputy sheriffs. 
In his decision dated September 13, 1979, the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) ruled 
that there should be a separate unit for deputy sheriffs and CSEA 
filed exceptions to that decision of the Director. In support of 
its exceptions, CSEA argues that the Director did not pay suf-
ficient attention to the fact that the deputy sheriffs' had been in 
the same unit as the County employees for ten years and that there 
is no evidence of any conflict of interest between the deputy 
sheriffs and the County employees throughout this period of time. 
Indeed, as noted by CSEA, it supported the deputy sheriffs in 
their one demand and it represented a deputy sheriff in the one 
grievance that emanated from that group of employees. 
CSEA further argues that the Director erred in that he 
considered the allegation that the County supports the petition. 
It contends that the evidence concerning the position of the 
County is not reliable because it was based on a poll of the mem-
bers of the County Board of Supervisors and not on a formal reso- .: 
lution of that Board. Finally, CSEA argues that the fact that the 
deputy sheriffs are jointly employed by the Sheriff and the County 
while the other unit members are employees of the County only is of 
little consequence because the Sheriff has always deferred to the 
County in negotiations. 
DISCUSSION 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the determination of 
the Director. 
The County prefers a separate unit of deputy sheriffs. 
Evidence of that preference is a mere statement which is not sup-
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ported by reasons. While the statement of a public employer that 
one negotiating unit structure would better serve its adminis-
trative convenience than another is entitled to some weight 
(Sullivan County, 7 PERB 1f3069 [1974], City of Amsterdam, 10 PERB 
1f3031 [1977]), here, the County does not even assert that the 
negotiating unit structure it prefers would better serve its 
administrative convenience than the existing unit structure does. 
Accordingly, we give no weight to the stated preference of the ' •• 
County. 
The stated!..-preference of the Sheriff is a different matter. 
In part, his preference is based upon the fact that the deputy 
sheriffs are police officers and that they may have police respon-
sibilities in the event of a strike by the County employees. This 
is related to the unit standard specified in §207.1(c) of the 
Taylor Law that "the unit shall be compatible with the joint 
responsibilities of the public employer and public employees to 
serve the public". It is this standard that is the basis of the 
consideration of the administrative convenience of the employer. 
CSEA would have us disregard this concern because strikes by public 
amployees are illegal under New York State law. This response is 
lot persuasive because strikes by public employees do occur not-
withstanding their illegality. 
The second reason for the Sheriff's preference is related 
to his role -- or absence of a role --in negotiations. The 
Sheriff has had no role in negotiations since his appointment in 
Dctober, 1974, even though he is a joint employer of the deputy 
sheriffs. He did, however, seek a role in 1974, but he never 
received a response to the request that he addressed to the County, 
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which is the sole employer of 90% of the employees in the nego-
tiating unit. Because of this rebuff, he never actively sought a 
role in subsequent negotiations. However, because he did not par-
ticipate in negotiations, he does not deem himself bound by con-
tract provisions that might limit his authority. He has specif-
ically stated that he is not bound by the grievance procedure in 
the contract. However, when the one grievance was filed by a 
deputy sheriff, he did accept the advice of the County Attorney 
that he abide by the procedure. It thus appears that the structure 
of the current negotiating unit has deprived the Sheriff of an 
opportunity to participate in the negotiations for the terms and 
conditions of employment of his deputies; it has also deprived the 
deputy sheriffs of an opportunity to negotiate with the Sheriff, 
one of their joint employers. 
Balanced against this failure of the current negotiating 
structure to afford the Sheriff and deputy sheriffs an opportunity 
to negotiate with each other is the circumstance that for ten 
years there has been no apparent conflict of interest within the 
negotiating unit.. We have ruled that where there is evidence of 
a long-standing history of meaningful and effective negotiations fo 
all the employees in a negotiating unit, that unit will not be 
fragmented even though it contains elements which we would have 
placed in separate units had the issue been placed fefore us 
in the first instance. Town of Smithtown, 8 PERB 1(3015 (1975); 
County of Rockland, 10 PERB 1[3014 (1977). This ruling, however, 
is not absolute. In City of Amsterdam, 10 PERB 1[3031 (1977), we 
placed police and firefighters in separate negotiating units even 
though the evidence showed a long-standing history of meaningful 
and effective negotiations in a combined unit. Two circumstances 
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distinguished the situation in Amsterdam from the situation in 
Smithtown and Rockland. The first was the stated position of the 
employer that its administrative convenience would be better 
served by the separate units. The second was the strong prevail-
ing practice of placing police and firefighters in separate nego-
tiating units. In the instant case, the stated reason of the 
Sheriff for seeking a separate unit for deputy sheriffs is more 
persuasively related to his administrative convenience than was 
1 
the reason given by the Mayor in City.of Amsterdam. The existing 
unit structure has deprived both the Sheriff and the deputy 
sheriffs from participating in negotiations with each other. 
This deprivation is a compelling reason for establishing a 
separate unit for deputy sheriffs where, as here, the sheriff does 
not wish to delegate his negotiations responsibilities to the 
County. Notwithstanding a history of meaningful and effective 
negotiations for all employees in the existing negotiating unit, 
that unit cannot continue because it includes employees of both 
the County and of the County-Sheriff joint employer and the 
Sheriff and the deputy sheriffs object.;to such a unit. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that there be a negotiating unit 
that includes all full-time deputy sheriffs 
and excludes all other employees. 
1 The Mayor's reason was that he could negotiate a more 
favorable contract if he were not confronted with a unified 
group of policemen and firefighters. 
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WE FURTHER ORDER that an election by secret ballot be held, 
under the supervision of the Director, among 
the employees in the unit of deputy sheriffs 
who were employed on the payroll date 
immediately preceding the date of this 
decision, and that the joint employer submit 
to the Director, the Association, and CSEA, 
within ten days from the date of this 
decision, an alphabetized list of all 
employees within the unit of full-time 
deputy sheriffs who were employed on the 
payroll date immediately preceding the date 
of this decision. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 27, 1979 
Member Klaus did not participate. 
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SUFFOLK COUNTY PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, 
-and-
Respondent, 
#1B - 12/27/79 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3684 
KIMMELL & KIMMELL (LEONARD S. KIMMELL, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
HARTMAN & LERNER (CHARLES P. DeMARTIN, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
The charge herein which was filed by the Suffolk County 
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) alleges that Suffolk 
County (County) violated its duty to negotiate in good faith in 
that it unilaterally transferred police officers working in the 
Central Records, Teletype and Firearms sections of its police 
department to other sections of the department, and concomitantly 
hired civilian personnel to perform the former duties of the dis-
placed officers. PBA's charge is not that the County couldn't 
transfer police officers in these sections to other sections, but 
that it could replace them only with other unit employees. 
The facts are as alleged in the charge. On those facts, 
lowever, the hearing officer dismissed the charge. He did so 
)ecause he ruled that the replacement of policemen by employees who 
ire not policemen is not a violation of the County's duty to 
2H 
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1 
negotiate. 
PBA has filed exceptions to that ruling. In support of its 
exceptions, it argues that the assignment of tasks to civilian 
employees which had previously been performed by police officers 
is a mandatory subject of negotiation. It further argues that the 
hearing officer erred in that he did not give sufficient attention 
to the County's unilateral change of the negotiating unit. 
DISCUSSION 
The hearing officer reasoned correctly that the charge 
places in issue the authority of an employer to determine the 
qualifications for a position. The status of police officer is 
one which is attained only through the satisfaction of numerous 
special employment qualifications, including stringent age, educa-
tion, height, weight, physical health, physical fitness and police 
2 
training requirements, and the County determined that those quali-
fications were not needed for employees assigned to certain record 
maintenance, teletype and training tasks. It is these tasks, pre-
viously performed by police officers, which it assigned to 
civilian employees. The hearing officer also ruled correctly that 
a public employer is authorized to determine the qualifications for 
1 There is no evidence, or even any allegation, that the transfers 
were designed to deprive employees of their right of organization 
There is also no allegation that the changes made by the County 
had any impact upon the terms or conditions of employment of uni|t 
employees about which the County refused to negotiate. Thus, no 
other improper practices are involved in this case. The comment 
of the hearing officer concerning the possibility of a new charg 
should the County abuse its right to alter the qualifications 
for employees in the Central Records, Teletype and Firearms 
sections of the police department are, therefore, gratuitous. 
So are his comments concerning the possible impact of the 
County's action. 
See, e.g., the minimum qualifications for appointment set out in 
CSL §58, GML §209-q and 9D NYCRR, Part 6000. 
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a position and that it need not negotiate such a determination. 
The right of the County to alter the qualifications of the 
personnel performing the tasks in question and to assign those 
tasks to civilian personnel does not automatically dispose of the 
allegation, emphasized in PBA's exceptions, that the County change 
the negotiating unit improperly. When work that has been performe 
by unit employees is reassigned to newly appointed employees, 
those newly appointed employees may be deemed to be performing 
unit work in which event they may be included in the unit. 
Alternatively, the employer may be duty bound to negotiate with th 
unit representative concerning the removal of the unit work--and 
the workers who perform that work--from the unit. East Ramapo 
Central School District, 10 PERB 113064 (1977) . On the record 
before us, however, we do not find this to be the case here. The 
recognition clause of the agreement between PBA and the County 
deals with a negotiating unit that is defined in terms of the 
qualifications of employees in the unit and not of the tasks 
assigned to them; PBA is recognized as the representative of poli 
4 
officers and detectives. 
3 See New York State Court Employees Assn., 12 PERB 113075 (1979) , 
rev'd. on other grounds, Evans v. Newman 100 M.2d 207 (1979), 
12 PERB 117016, aff'd. App. Div. 2d (3d Dept.,1979), 
12 PERB 117022; Chateaugay CSD, 12 PERB 1(3015 (1979) PBA of 
Hempstead, 11 PERB 113072 (1978) . 
4 Should PBA contend that, notwithstanding the recognition clause 
in its agreement, by reason of past practice, it represents the 
employees who have replaced the police officers in the Central 
Records, Teletype and Firearms sections of the police depart-
ment, it may assert that position to the employer and, if 
necessary, test it through the contractual grievance procedure. 
It may also seek to resolve the issue in a representation 
proceeding. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the hearing 
officer and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be and it 
hereby is DISMISSED. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 27, 1979 
Harold R. Tfewman, Chairman 
David C. Randies, Member 
Member Klaus did not participate. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
YONKERS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
YONKERS COUNCIL OF SUPERVISORY 
ASSOCIATIONS, LOCAL 8, AFSA, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
ARTHUR J. DORAN, JR., ESQ., for Respondent 
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON II, ESQ., for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Yonkers 
Council of Supervisory Associations, Local 8, AFSA, AFL-CIO (Local 
8), to a decision of a hearing officer dismissing its charge. The 
charge was that the Yonkers City School District (District) uni-
laterally changed a term and condition of the employment of unit 
employees when it terminated its past practice of paying the full 
cost of the employees' health insurance premiums. 
FACTS 
The 1974-77 agreement between Local 8 and the District imposec 
an obligation upon the District to pay premiums in the amount of 
$1,100 per employee for health insurance. The actual cost of the 
premiums for the insurance provided, however, was $1,178 in 1974, 
1 
$1,225 in 1975, $1,400 in 1976 and $1,826 in 1977, and the District 
paid the full amount of the premiums throughout the contract 
T These are tEe" costs of the family plan insurance coverage. 
The charge herein is not concerned with the individual plan. 
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period. 
The District and Local 8 did not conclude an agreement for a 
contract to succeed the one that expired on June 30, 1977, until 
April 13, 1978, and it did not take effect until about a month 
later when it was approved by the Yonkers Emergency Financial 
Control Board. The successor contract was retroactive to July 1, 
1977, and ran for one year. Even before negotiations for the 
1977-78 contract had commenced, the District had expressed a con-
cern that the actual cost of health insurance premiums was in 
excess of its contract obligation and, at the beginning of nego-
tiations, the Superintendent of the District stated that it was 
improper for the District to pay above the contractually obligated 
amount. During the course of the ensuing negotiations between the 
District and Local 8, the parties agreed that the District's 
obligation for health insurance premiums would increase form $1,100 
to $1,310. In return for the $210 increase, Local 8 agreed to 
forego an annual physical examination which cost the District $210. 
On the day that the 1977-78 agreement was concluded, the 
Superintendent of the District once again told the negotiators, for 
Local 8 that the District wanted a "cap" on its obligation for 
health insurance premiums. He further told them that the District 
had approved the increase from $1,100 to $1,310 reluctantly and 
only because the money for that increase had come from the elim-
ination of the cost of the physical examination. However, notwith-
standing his statement about the concern of the District to limit 
the amount that it was paying for health insurance premiums, the 
Superintendent of the District did tell the negotiators ' for Local 
8 that the past practice of paying the full premium would continue, througi 
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the life of the contract. The time between the conclusion of the 
1977-78 agreement and its expiration was ten weeks, four of which 
were needed to obtain the approval of the Yonkers Emergency 
Financial Control Board. 
On May 19, 1978, shortly after the Emergency Financial Control 
Board gave its approval, the District's Assistant Superintendent 
for Business wrote to the President of Local 8 seeking a meeting 
"to discuss the purchase of fringe benefit insurance, pursuant to 
our recently negotiated contract." The reason for the meeting was 
to have Local 8 inform the District as to the preferences of 
Local 8 regarding two alternative means by which the District could 
implement the agreement:either by asking the insurance company to 
provide a benefit plan for the amount of the premium that it was 
obligated to pay or by continuing the preexisting plan while 
charging the employees for the difference between the $1,310 and 
the actual amount of the premium. The District also wanted to 
know whether Local 8 had any alternative suggestions for "complying 
with the cap on the contract." Local 8 responded that, inasmuch as 
the amount of the employer's contribution was not being reduced 
during the current contract period, the matter should be deferred 
to the negotiation of the contract that would succeed the one due 
to expire on June 30, 1978. 
Once again, on June 22, 1978, the District's Assistant 
Superintendent for Business wrote to the President of Local 8. 
This time he stated that, because Local 8 had not come up with any 
proposals, he would institute a plan which would "fall within the 
fiscal guidelines which were negotiated between your union and the 
Board of Education." The memorandum precipitated a meeting at 
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which the President of the union once again said that the matter 
should be deferred for future negotiations. 
Nothing further was said after that meeting until August 22, 
1978, when the Assistant District Superintendent for Business 
issued a memorandum to all unit employees. It stated that there 
would be no change in the health insurance coverage of the unit 
employees, but that effective immediately, each unit employee 
covered by the family plan would have $47.06 deducted from his 
monthly salary to pay for the amount of the premium that exceeded 
2 
the District's obligation. This action did not come as a surprise 
to the President of Local 8 who conceded; that the District had 
indicated that it would do so. 
The actual deductions did not commence until the second of the 
semi-monthly payments during October, 1978, but the District 
doubled the deduction during the first three payroll periods so :: 
that the employees did pay their share of the health insurance 
premiums from August 22, 1978, the time of the last memorandum of 
the District's Assistant Superintendent for Business. 
DISCUSSION 
In support of its exceptions, Local 8 argues that the District's 
contractual obligation to pay a specified amount of health in-
surance premiums was never intended to limit the District's 
obligation as evidenced by the District's past practice of paying 
more than the amount that it was contractually obligated to pay. 
2 The cost of the individual plan did not exceed $1,310 and was 
not affected. 
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It finds support for this argument in the fact that after the 
agreement, the District continued, until August 22, 1978, to pay 
the full amount of the premiums without charging the employees for 
the cost in excess of the contractual rate. 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the decision of the 
hearing officer that the District did not act unilaterally when 
it discontinued its past practice of paying employee health in-
surance premiums in full. The extent of the District's obligation 
was fully negotiated and, as expressly stated in the agreement and 
accepted by Local 8, that obligation was to pay health insurance 
premiums, in the amount of $1,310 per employee. All that Local 8 
could get from the District in those negotiations was an under-
standing that because only a short time remained to the end of that 
school year, the District would not cut its payments to the amount 
required by the new contract during the balance of that school yeai. 
Where parties reach an understanding that a particular benefit 
will be furnished only during the contract period and will cease 
upon the expiration of the contract, that benefit lapses with the 
contract. It is not a part of the status quo which is deemed to 
3 
continue after the expiration of the contract. This principle is 
applicable to the facts before us. Here, the understanding that the 
District would continue to pay the full amount of the premiums 
until the end of the 1977-78 school year only, clearly did not 
obligate it to continue to do so thereafter. 
3 See Massapequa UFSD, 8 PERB 1(3022 (1975) in which we held 
that a benefit provided by a legislative determination, which 
took the place of an agreement, need not be continued after 
the expiration of the period covered by the legislative 
determination because that determination expressly stated 
that the benefits would be provided during that period only. 
6:1.18 
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We do not find that the District's continued payment of the 
full premium during July and August 1978 evidenced an intention to 
pay more of the health insurance premium than it had obligated 
itself to pay in the 1977-78 agreement. Local 8 was on notice 
throughout this period that the District did not intend to pay 
more than its contractual obligation. As conceded by its President 
Local 8 knew that the District was continuing to pay the full 
amount of the premiums on a temporary basis only, for the period 
necessary to resolve the alternative questions: whether to cut the 
premium by reducing the insurance benefits or to charge the unit 
employees a part of the amount of the premium. This period was 
extended by reason of Local 8's refusal to participate in dis-
cussions as to how the limitation upon the District's obligation 
should be implemented. 
.We conclude that the action of the District complained of 
herein was an implementation of an agreement it negotiated with 
Local 8 and it did not constitute an improper action. 
WE ORDER the charge herein be , and it hereby is , DISMISSED. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 27, 1979 
laroJhd R. Newman, Chairman 
David C Rand 
Member Klaus did no t p a r t i c i p a t e . 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
NEW YORK), 
Respondent, 
-and-
COMMITTEE OF INTERNS AND RESIDENTS, 
Charging Party, 
- and-
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, INC., 
Intervenor. 
JOSEPH M. BRESS, ESQ., for Respondent 
JEFFREY M. SELCHICK, ESQ., and 
MICHAEL KATZER, ESQ., of Counsel for 
Respondent 
IRWIN GELLER, ESQ., for Charging Party 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ., for Intervenor 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Committee of 
Interns and Residents (hereinafter CIR) to the decision of a hearing 
officer dismissing its charge that the State of New York (State 
University of New York), (hereinafter employer) violated §209-a.l(a) 
of the Taylor Law by negotiating with United University Professions 
Inc. , (hereinafter UUP) during the pendency of a question concern:?: 
ing representation. 
CIR filed a petition in August 1978 seeking a separate unit 
for the house staff officers, who are currently within the pro-; ; 
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fessional services unit for the State University system and are 
represented by UUP. The Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (hereinafter Director) determined that an 
election should be held among employees in the existing profession-
al services unit without first resolving the question whether house 
staff officers should be removed from the unit. The house staff 
officers, who comprised approximately 490 of the 16,000 employees 
in the professional services unit, would vote separately on what 
organization should represent them if they were placed in a 
separate unit and what organization should represent them if they 
were placed in the over-all university faculty unit. The reason for 
this procedure was that it would permit negotiations for the terms 
and conditions of almost 16,000 employees to proceed while the 
complex question of the unit placement of about 500 employees was 
being litigated. 
This two tiered election was held after this Board denied a 
motion of CIR that the filing of exceptions to the interlocutory 
determination of the Director be authorized. 11 PERB 1(3097 (1978) . 
UUP was successful in the election in the over-all unit, and the 
ballots in the proposed separate house staff unit election were 
1 
never counted. Thereafter, the employer negotiated with UUP for 
all unit employees except those affected by CIR's petition. 
1 The petition of CIR to represent the house staff officers in a 
separate unit was subsequently dismissed because of a strike 
by CIR. 12 PERB 1(3092 (1979) . 
p-f Oi 
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The basis of CIR's charge is its assertion that the house 
staff officers have been prejudiced by the negotiations between 
UUP and the employer. Those negotiations did not deal with any 
house staff issues. However, according to CIR, upon its certi-
fication, UUP could not be expected to accord the concerns of the 
house staff officers any particular consideration but would, per-
force, extend the basic UUP contract to them. 
The hearing officer dismissed the charge. He determined that 
neither the representation rights nor the negotiation rights of 
the house staff officers would be prejudiced by the negotiations 
between.the employer and UUP. He also determined that CIR's 
representation rights were not prejudiced because the negotiations 
took place after all ballots had been cast. 
We affirm the. decision of the hearing officer for the reasons 
tated in his opinion. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be and it 
hereby is DISMISSED. 
6ATED: Albany, New York 
December 27, 1979 
Member Klaus did not participate. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LACKAWANNA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
LACKAWANNA UNIT, ERIE EDUCATIONAL 
LOCAL 868, CSEA-AFSCME, 
Charging Party. 
EARL C. KNIGHT, for Respondent 
KAVINOKY, COOK, SANDLER, GARDNER, WISBAUM 
& LIPMAN (RONALD L. JAROS, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
This matter is before us on the exceptions of the 
Lackawanna City School District (District) to a decision of a 
hearing officer that it violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law 
by refusing to negotiate in good faith. The violation, as found 
by the hearing officer, is that the District unilaterally 
(1) reduced the weekly hours of work of assistant custodians from 
40 to 22, and (2) cut the wages and other benefits of the assistant 
custodians whose hours had been cut. 
The District acknowledged that it cut the hours of work and 
benefits of the assistant custodians unilaterally, but it asserted 
that it was under no duty to negotiate the cuts before imposing 
them. Its posture was that the imposition of the cuts was a 
management prerogative, and that its obligation to negotiate did 
not arise until after its action, at which time it became obligated 
to negotiate the impact of its action. The hearing officer found 
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that the District was ready to negotiate the impact of its action, 
but he.determined that the action itself had to be negotiated. In 
doing so, he distinguished between the action of a public employer 
in cutting hours and benefits of employees and its action in 
eliminating positions and laying off employees. The latter course, 
he ruled, is a management prerogative, but the former is not. 
DISCUSSION 
The first argument made by the District in support of its 
exceptions is that the hearing officer erred in that he failed to 
find that the District had eliminated the prior positions of full-
time assistant custodians and that it had created new positions of 
part-time assistant custodians. The record does not support this 
argument. Rather it indicates that the positions of assistant 
custodians were retained, but the hours of the positions were 
cut. Indicative of this are the entries in the District's budget, 
which typically read: 
Account Adopted 1977-78 Adopted 1978-79 
Assistant Custodian $10,221 $ 5,111 
Further supporting this conclusion is the fact that the employees 
who had worked as full-time assistant custodians were continued 
as part-time assistant custodians. 
The alternative arguments made by the District in support of 
its exceptions raise three questions: (1) Did it have the right to 
cut the hours of the assistant custodians unilaterally?, (2) Did 
it have the right to cut the wages of the assistant custodians 
unilaterally?, and (3) Did it have the right to cut the fringe 
benefits of the assistant custodians unilaterally?. 
In City of White Plains, 5 PERB 1(3008 (1972), we determined 
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that it is a management prerogative for a public employer to 
determine the number of employees in a given classification that 
it must have on duty at any given time, but that the scheduling 
of individual employees for the purposes of satisfying the man-
power needs of the public employer is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. Thus, the District was obligated to negotiate the 
scheduling of assistant custodians unless all of them work the 
identical 22-hour schedule. Only in that event is the District's 
action in cutting the assistant custodians' hours of work from 
40 to 22 validated by its management prerogative of determining 
when it required the services of assistant custodians. In 
other circumstances, the District was required to negotiate the 
hours and schedules of the assistant custodians. On the record 
before us, however, we cannot ascertain whether the unilateral cut 
in the hours of the assistant custodians was or was not valid.— 
Assuming the right of the District to curtail the hours of its 
assistant custodians, it nevertheless has no right to change their 
wages and fringe benefits unilaterally. There is no evidence in 
the record as to the basis upon which wages were paid to the 
assistant custodians whose hours were cut or whether those wages 
were in accordance with any agreement. There is evidence that 
the parties had negotiated a fringe benefit package for regular 
part-time employees, but there is no evidence in the record whether 
the fringe benefits that were given to the assistant custodians 
2 
whose hours were cut were in accordance with the agreement.— 
1 There are post hearing statements by the employer concerning 
this matter, but there is no evidence in the record. 
2 Again, there are post hearing statements by the employer 
concerning this matter, but no evidence in the record. 
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On the record before us, we cannot determine whether the 
District acted improperly when it reduced the weekly hours of 
work of assistant custodians from 40 to 22 and it reduced the 
wages and other benefits of the assistant custodians whose hours 
had been cut. Moreover, assuming a violation by the District, 
the record does not provide us with sufficient information for 
the fashioning of an appropriate remedy. 
Accordingly, we remand this matter to the hearing officer for 
further evidence and a new decision and recommended order. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 27, 1979 
Member Klaus did not participate. 
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The Garrison Teachers Association (GTA), the intervenor 
herein, has made a motion pursuant to §204.7(h) of our Rules for 
permission to appeal an interlocutory ruling of a hearing officer 
directly to this Board.— The hearing officer's ruling was on a 
motion to dismiss the charge of the Garrison Educators Association 
(GEA) that the Garrison Union Free School District (the District) 
violated §209-a.l(a), (b), and (c) of the Taylor Law by discrim-
inating against employees, coercing them, and otherwise 
interfering in an election in which GTA and GEA are contesting 
to represent employees of the District. The basis of the motion 
is GTA's contention that GEA has no standing to file an improper 
practice charge because it has not been certified or recognized. 
—Section 204.7(h) provides: "All motions and rulings made at 
the hearing shall be part of the record of the proceeding and, 
unless expressly authorized by the Board, shall not be appealed 
directly to the Board but shall be considered by the Board 
whenever the case is submitted to it for decision." 
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The hearing officer dismissed the motion, saying "it is not a 
prerequisite for the filing of an improper practice charge that 
an employee organization be either certified or recognized." 
Having considered the motion, the Board hereby denies review 
of the interlocutory ruling. 
The motion is DENIED. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
December 27, 1979 
Member Klaus did not participate. 
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